urn:uuid:201c3fb3-b4bd-3a4e-85ed-16327d11d7a62026-06-10T00:00:00ZThe Tor ProjectOfficial channel for news and updates from the Tor Project2026-06-10T00:00:00ZASL19 urn:uuid:4b9df2d0-afc1-319f-80f3-7b315ef52b4d <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/when-you-need-a-tool-to-reach-the-tool-Paskoocheh/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/when-you-need-a-tool-to-reach-the-tool-Paskoocheh/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/when-you-need-a-tool-to-reach-the-tool-Paskoocheh/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p><em><strong>++ This guest post is part of a spotlight series on the organizations <a href="https://internetfreedom.torproject.org/">defending the free Internet</a>.++</strong></em></p> <p>Due to heavy information controls, people in Iran face significant barriers to accessing the Internet. Authorities have actively blocked numerous websites and apps, including conventional circumvention and digital security tools such as VPNs, social media platforms, and the app stores themselves. This creates a "chicken-and-egg" problem: users need a VPN to download a VPN.</p> <p>Launched in 2016, <a href="https://paskoocheh.com/">Paskoocheh</a>, Persian for "alleyway," is an open source alternative app store, community hub, and one-stop-shop for users to access information and tools to circumvent censorship, enhance their privacy, securely communicate, and express themselves freely online. Developed and maintained by ASL19, a technology and exiled media organization named after Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Paskoocheh restores access and allows people to reach trusted tools through four censorship-resilient channels: the Paskoocheh website, Android App, Email bot, and Telegram bot. </p> <p>Users are also able to reach our Persian-speaking support team through the Paskoocheh Helpdesk, which handles over 200 tickets daily. In addition, ASL19 translates and publishes accessible user guides, <a href="https://paskoocheh.com/blog/posts/">blog posts</a>, and multimedia content to help users navigate online privacy and digital security best practices.</p> <p>Paskoocheh serves as more than an alternative app store; it is also a bridge between tool developers and in-country users. Our support team relays user feedback to tool developers, helping improve tools and overall experience in Iran. We also conduct in-country testing with developers and user communities to evaluate new features and strengthen censorship-resilient technologies.</p> <h2>Paskoocheh's impact so far</h2> <p>This combination of access, user support, and education has turned Paskoocheh into a critical lifeline for users in Iran.</p> <ul> <li><p><strong># of tool downloads since 2016:</strong>  17,634,852 </p> </li> <li><p><strong># of community members in Iran supporting testing and localization efforts:</strong> 2,000+</p> </li> <li><p><strong># of monthly active users on web and app:</strong> ~200K</p> </li> </ul> <p>During periods of internet disruption and nationwide protests in Iran, these tools became critical communication lifelines. One longtime user wrote to us: </p> <blockquote><p><em>"I've been using this free app for several years now. It's free, unique, and unlike others, it has no equal." Reflecting on the broader digital environment in the country, they added that "in these difficult economic conditions, people are struggling just to survive, while many apps either empty people's pockets, deceive and lie to them, or serve as tools for spying and propaganda."</em></p> </blockquote> <p>Messages like these highlight the importance of privacy-preserving technologies in environments where surveillance, censorship, and disinformation shape everyday life online. In moments of crisis, internet freedom tools become part of how people maintain relationships, exchange trusted information, and stay connected to the outside world. For some users, these tools also made it possible to continue reporting on events on the ground, verify information during periods of state-backed disinformation, and safely communicate evidence of abuses despite widespread surveillance and connectivity disruptions.</p> <h2>The future of Paskoocheh: Scaling a community-first approach to internet freedom</h2> <p>As internet censorship tactics evolve rapidly, internet shutdowns are becoming more frequent and more sophisticated, cutting communities off from information, communication, and one another. </p> <p>What we have learned through this work is that access alone is not enough. Technology is only useful if people trust it, understand how to use it safely, and can rely on support networks when digital spaces become unstable or dangerous.</p> <p>That is why our work extends beyond technical development. Alongside building secure access technologies, ASL19 invests heavily in user education, digital security guidance, and community capacity building. Every support ticket answered, training delivered, and piece of digital safety guidance shared helps people stay connected under pressure. </p> <p>This human-centered approach is becoming increasingly important as authoritarian tactics evolve globally. During internet shutdowns and heightened censorship, local helper communities often become the first line of assistance for journalists, activists, students, and ordinary citizens. </p> <p>With additional support, ASL19 aims to continue expanding Paskoocheh beyond its current capacity into a broader resilience ecosystem that combines technical innovation with stronger on-the-ground support systems. This includes improving access to trusted circumvention and privacy tools during shutdowns, expanding multilingual user support and educational resources, and deepening collaboration with communities operating under digital authoritarianism. </p> <p>This work is not solely about technology products. At a moment when most people's understanding of the internet is shaped by the little squares in their pockets, it is important to acknowledge and support the broader ecosystems that make access possible. Civil society, independent media, and grassroots communities all play a part in helping people survive under pressure. This is why partnerships within the internet freedom ecosystem matter. Living under digital authoritarianism means that these are not abstract protections against hypothetical risks, but practical tools that make journalism, organizing, education, and communication possible in the first place. </p> <h3>About ASL19</h3> <p>Named after Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ASL19 is a technology and exiled media organization working to counter digital authoritarianism. For more than a decade, we have partnered with civil society groups, journalists, researchers, activists, and internet users living under some of the world's most restrictive online environments. Guided by the belief that privacy and internet freedom are essential to safe communication, access to information, and civic participation, ASL19 develops technologies and support systems that help people navigate censorship, surveillance, internet shutdowns, and information manipulation. In countries such as Iran, Russia, and China, these tools serve as critical lifelines, enabling people to communicate securely, access information, document human rights abuses, and stay connected to the outside world.</p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/community"> community </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/human-rights"> human rights </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/partners"> partners </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/fundraising"> fundraising </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-06-04T00:00:00ZBlueprint for Free Speech urn:uuid:cd64244c-d7c3-3bdb-b526-2d4a2723bd3c <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/supporting-those-who-speak-out/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/supporting-those-who-speak-out/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/supporting-those-who-speak-out/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p><em><strong>++ This guest post is part of a spotlight series on the organizations <a href="https://internetfreedom.torproject.org/">defending the free Internet</a>.++</strong></em></p> <p>Fear of digital surveillance breeds silence. </p> <p>In the words of a youth activist in Zambia who took part in a research study tracking digital security threats: </p> <blockquote><p><em>We are all fearful. It makes you constantly paranoid. It also undermines our work. It discourages us. It's very disheartening. It's difficult to keep the fire going. I've sort of stepped back from the front line.</em></p> </blockquote> <p>Silencing of whistleblowers, journalists and human rights defenders deprives citizens of the credible information they need to participate meaningfully in public life. It undermines democracy, enabling corruption and human rights abuses to flourish.</p> <p><a href="https://www.blueprintforfreespeech.net/">Blueprint for Free Speech</a> is a non-profit committed above all to upholding the right to freedom of opinion and expression for all people, as enshrined <a href="https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights">by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a>. We work internationally to promote protections for a free and independent media, the free flow of information, institutional transparency and support for whistleblowers.</p> <p>Industrial-scale surveillance with military-grade spyware is having a chilling effect on investigative journalism and human rights advocacy work, with profound implications for access to truth about power. </p> <h2>Killer corporations</h2> <p>Free access to reliable information has never mattered more. Some of the world's biggest corporations are manipulating scientific data, controlling narratives and capturing regulators to sell products they know will kill us.  That's not an overstatement: it's the conclusion of the New England Journal of Medicine. Their latest <a href="https://adambspencer.substack.com/p/the-five-things-most-likely-to-kill?utm_source=post-email-title&amp;publication_id=4072343&amp;post_id=197497142&amp;utm_campaign=email-post-title&amp;isFreemail=true&amp;r=8fq09f&amp;triedRedirect=true&amp;utm_medium=email">research</a> shows fossil fuels, tobacco, alcohol, ultra-processed foods, chemicals and pesticides, and drugs such as opioids cause 20 million deaths a year.</p> <p>Blueprint works closely with activists, journalists and whistleblowers in many of these fields, exposing or highlighting a range of public interest issues, from data privacy violations in the EU, organ trafficking in East Africa and deaths squads in West Africa and South Africa, the collapse of quality control at Boeing in the US, and the dirty tricks deployed by big tobacco in Asia and Africa. </p> <p>We provide them with support, <a href="https://www.blueprintforfreespeech.net/en/prize/2025-winners">public recognition</a>, guidance, referrals and training, legal assessments, as well as arming them with actionable <a href="https://www.blueprintforfreespeech.net/en/library/reports">research</a>. </p> <p>More recently, with the rise of unaccountable tech oligarchs raising the spectre of a dystopian cybernetic authoritarianism, we are increasingly supporting AI whistleblowers and have added artificial intelligence safety to our arsenal of offerings through a new European project.  </p> <p>A common thread is the need to guard against intrusive surveillance. For anonymous whistleblowers, this translates into the difference between coming forward with public interest disclosures that could save lives, or staying silent. For journalists and activists, it means being able to continue the work of speaking truth to power. </p> <h2>Ricochet Refresh</h2> <p>Blueprint develops and maintains software that allows people to reach out to the media, NGOs and anti-corruption agencies anonymously. <a href="https://www.ricochetrefresh.net/">Ricochet Refresh</a> is a peer-to-peer, instant messaging application by Blueprint that prioritizes user privacy and user control by design. The application and protocol are completely decentralized, and do not depend on any third-party infrastructure apart from the Tor network itself. Best of all, the project is community-driven, so we listen to what people need when using it and translate that into action.</p> <p>Ricochet Refresh is free and open-source software that works by creating a Tor onion service on your computer, which serves as your anonymous identity and endpoint on the network. When you communicate with a contact, a Tor circuit is established between your machine, routing data through multiple nodes so that no single node knows both the origin and destination. This strengthens anonymity. All communications are end-to-end encrypted, so message contents are only visible to the parties in a conversation.</p> <p>The architecture makes it particularly valuable for protecting freedom of expression among civil society groups worldwide who face surveillance risks. The Ricochet Refresh package also bundles in the Tor Project's censorship-circumvention tools to enable connectivity even in constrained network environments. It is one of the only free, open-source applications that allows unlimited file size transfer on a fully anonymized basis. This is incredibly important if you're a journalist, activist or whistleblower who wants to transfer large files, such as videos. </p> <h2>Cybersecurity training</h2> <p>Since 2024, Blueprint has conducted a series of cybersecurity training sessions in over a dozen lower- and middle-income countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, where the need for technical support to guard against digital surveillance is the greatest. We support journalists, researchers, community advocacy workers and others who face threats to their digital and often personal safety.</p> <p>These sessions apply foundational and more advanced digital security precautions with expert facilitators on-hand to help participants make practical changes to their device set-ups during the sessions. They walk out at the end of the day more cybersecure than when they arrived in the morning. As part of this, we introduce them to metadata-resistant communications platforms --  including Ricochet Refresh -- to make it safer to receive whistleblower disclosures.</p> <p>Whistleblowers often face vicious retaliation attacks. Anonymity gives them some protection -- and it does something else important: it shifts the public conversation from "let's blame the whistleblower!" to "let's focus on finding out about the wrongdoing".</p> <p>The impact of this work, made possible thanks to the time and energy invested by many people and organizations who ensure the internet is kept open and secure, is tangible and profound. As this journalist in North Africa put it: </p> <blockquote><p><em>This session made me realise, in a very concrete way, that cybersecurity isn't just an IT department's responsibility, but also concerns my daily actions, my digital reflexes, and how I protect my professional identity online. As a journalist, this pragmatic approach was particularly useful: it gave me concrete tools, but also a new framework for analysing the risks I face.</em></p> </blockquote> <p><strong>The digital threats faced by defenders of truth and democracy are multiplying. So should our capacity to respond to them. The free internet is at the frontline of this battle, and Blueprint's digital protection tools make a difference where it counts.</strong></p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/community"> community </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/human-rights"> human rights </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/partners"> partners </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/fundraising"> fundraising </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-06-04T00:00:00Ztails urn:uuid:a888ec50-b5b8-3364-a773-5d40873dd985 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_8_1/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_8_1/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_8_1/lead.jpg"> </picture> <div class="body"><p>This release is an emergency release to fix a serious security vulnerability in the Linux kernel, as well as security vulnerabilities in the <em>Tor</em> client.</p> <h2>Changes and updates</h2> <ul> <li><p>Update the <em>Tor</em> client to 0.4.9.9, which fixes <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/raw/release-0.4.9/ReleaseNotes">several security vulnerabilities</a>.</p> </li> <li><p>Update the <em>Linux</em> kernel to 6.12.90-2, which fixes <a href="https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-43503">CVE-2026-43503</a>, a vulnerability that could allow an application in Tails to gain administration privileges.</p> </li> </ul> <p>For example, if an attacker was able to exploit other unknown security vulnerabilities in an application included in Tails, they might then use this vulnerability to take full control of your Tails and deanonymize you.</p> <p>This attack is very unlikely, but could be performed by a strong attacker, such as a government or a hacking firm. We are not aware of this vulnerability being used in practice until now.</p> <h2>Get Tails 7.8.1</h2> <h3>To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage</h3> <ul> <li><p>Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.8.1.</p> </li> <li><p>If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a <a href="https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/#manual">manual upgrade</a>.</p> </li> </ul> <h3>To install Tails 7.8.1 on a new USB stick</h3> <p>Follow our <a href="https://tails.net/install/">installation instructions</a>.</p> <p>The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.</p> <h3>To download only</h3> <p>If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.8.1 directly:</p> <ul> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/download/">For USB sticks (USB image)</a></p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/download-iso/">For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO image)</a></p> </li> </ul> <h2>Support and feedback</h2> <p>For support and feedback, visit the <a href="https://tails.net/support/">Support section</a> on the Tails website.</p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tails"> tails </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/releases"> releases </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-06-03T00:00:00Zma1 urn:uuid:0f76ad8e-4e71-30e3-b971-689bf33e3245 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-alpha-release-tor-browser-160a7/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-alpha-release-tor-browser-160a7/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/new-alpha-release-tor-browser-160a7/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p>Tor Browser 16.0a7 is now available from the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/download/alpha/">Tor Browser download page</a> and also from our <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/16.0a7/">distribution directory</a>.</p> <p>This version includes important <a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/">security updates</a> to Firefox.</p> <p>⚠️ <strong>Reminder</strong>: The Tor Browser Alpha release-channel is for <a href="https://community.torproject.org/user-research/become-tester/">testing only</a>. As such, Tor Browser Alpha is not intended for general use because it is more likely to include bugs affecting usability, security, and privacy.</p> <p>Moreover, Tor Browser Alphas are now based on Firefox's betas. Please read more about this important change in the <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/future-of-tor-browser-alpha/">Future of Tor Browser Alpha</a> blog post.</p> <p>If you are an at-risk user, require strong anonymity, or just want a reliably-working browser, please stick with the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/download/">stable release channel</a>.</p> <h2>Send us your feedback</h2> <p>If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, <a href="https://support.torproject.org/misc/bug-or-feedback/">please let us know</a>.</p> <h2>Full changelog</h2> <p>The <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/raw/main/projects/browser/Bundle-Data/Docs-TBB/ChangeLog.txt">full changelog</a> since Tor Browser 16.0a6 is:</p> <ul> <li>All Platforms<ul> <li>Updated NoScript to 13.6.19.90401984</li> <li>Updated Tor to 0.4.9.9</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42436">Bug tor-browser#42436</a>: Allow for multiple configured (front, reflector) domain fronting pairs in Moat module</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44869">Bug tor-browser#44869</a>: Rebase alpha onto 151</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44952">Bug tor-browser#44952</a>: TOR_PROVIDER=none throws an error at launch</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44989">Bug tor-browser#44989</a>: Backport Bug 2040704: Fix date format leak in Firefox 151</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44990">Bug tor-browser#44990</a>: CI failing due to dubious ownership of cached repo</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44999">Bug tor-browser#44999</a>: Privacy settings are broken in 151</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41686">Bug tor-browser-build#41686</a>: Copy more build artifacts to the artifacts directory</li> </ul> </li> <li>Windows + macOS + Linux<ul> <li>Updated Firefox to 151.0a1</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44903">Bug tor-browser#44903</a>: Use the <code>support-page</code> instead of <code>tor-manual-page</code> in <code>moz-support-link</code></li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44904">Bug tor-browser#44904</a>: Use settings config for onion site settings</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44991">Bug tor-browser#44991</a>: Improve the no-authentication handling on the control port</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44997">Bug tor-browser#44997</a>: Captcha doesn't work in TB desktop</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/45005">Bug tor-browser#45005</a>: Rename arrowpanel CSS variable</li> </ul> </li> <li>Windows<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44745">Bug tor-browser#44745</a>: Change how we hide SSO setting for windows</li> </ul> </li> <li>Android<ul> <li>Updated GeckoView to 151.0a1</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/43543">Bug tor-browser#43543</a>: Make the dev icon distinct from the nightly one</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44211">Bug tor-browser#44211</a>: Disable "Shake it up. Skip the scroll."</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44323">Bug tor-browser#44323</a>: Audit Android Settings changes from 128 to 140</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44917">Bug tor-browser#44917</a>: Disable Ads client for all channels</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/45031">Bug tor-browser#45031</a>: Disable AI features for Android</li> </ul> </li> <li>Build System<ul> <li>All Platforms<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41779">Bug tor-browser-build#41779</a>: Update toolchains for Firefox 151</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41781">Bug tor-browser-build#41781</a>: Fix clean section in rbm.local.conf.example</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41792">Bug tor-browser-build#41792</a>: Switch from ftp.gnu.org to ftpmirror.gnu.org</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41798">Bug tor-browser-build#41798</a>: Update the URL to versions.ini in relprep.py</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41806">Bug tor-browser-build#41806</a>: <code>make list_toolchain_updates</code> should check var/firefox_platform_version</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41807">Bug tor-browser-build#41807</a>: Incorrectly generated Bugzilla query link in generate-bugzilla-triage-csv.py</li> </ul> </li> <li>Windows + Linux + Android<ul> <li>Updated Go to 1.26.3</li> </ul> </li> <li>macOS<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41793">Bug tor-browser-build#41793</a>: Stop copying permissions from .mar in dmg2mar</li> </ul> </li> <li>Android<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41801">Bug tor-browser-build#41801</a>: Hardlink artifacts in fix_gradle_deps.py</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/applications"> applications </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/releases"> releases </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-06-03T00:00:00Zma1 urn:uuid:a4adb953-aa5a-3529-bc65-8ed1171e1432 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15015/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15015/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15015/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p>Tor Browser 15.0.15 is now available from the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/download/">Tor Browser download page</a> and also from our <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/15.0.15/">distribution directory</a>.</p> <p>This release contains important security updates to the tor daemon and fixes some censorship circumvention problems.</p> <h2>Send us your feedback</h2> <p>If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, <a href="https://support.torproject.org/misc/bug-or-feedback/">please let us know</a>.</p> <h2>Full changelog</h2> <p>The <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/raw/maint-15.0/projects/browser/Bundle-Data/Docs-TBB/ChangeLog.txt">full changelog</a> since Tor Browser 15.0.14 is:</p> <ul> <li>All Platforms<ul> <li>Updated NoScript to 13.6.20.1984</li> <li>Updated Tor to 0.4.9.9</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/42436">Bug tor-browser#42436</a>: Allow for multiple configured (front, reflector) domain fronting pairs in Moat module</li> </ul> </li> <li>Windows + macOS + Linux<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44997">Bug tor-browser#44997</a>: Captcha doesn't work in TB desktop</li> </ul> </li> <li>Linux<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44886">Bug tor-browser#44886</a>: Backport tor-browser#44361: Notify Linux i686 users that they won't receive updates anymore</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/applications"> applications </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/releases"> releases </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-06-01T00:00:00Zgabi urn:uuid:09c4bba4-7a0a-3f6e-862c-04853f476a67 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/arti_2_4_0_released/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/arti_2_4_0_released/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/arti_2_4_0_released/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p>Arti is our ongoing project to create a next-generation Tor implementation in Rust. We're happy to announce the latest release, Arti 2.4.0.</p> <p>This release continues our ongoing development towards using Arti as a relay and as a directory authority. It also contains fixes for a number of bugs affecting onion service client connectivity.</p> <p>Additionally, as of this release, <a href="https://spec.torproject.org/proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt">flow control and congestion control</a> is considered stable, and can be enabled by compiling Arti with the <code>flowctl-cc</code> feature.</p> <p>Users of the <code>arti-client</code> crate should note that there are multiple breaking changes to the <code>TorClient</code> APIs, and that the <code>use_obsolete_software</code> option has been removed (see <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/work_items/1960">#1960</a>).</p> <p>As usual, this release also contains a number of bugfixes, cleanups, and improvements to our CI infrastructure.</p> <p>For full details on what we've done, including API changes, and for information about many more minor and less-visible changes, please see the <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#arti-240--1-june-2026">CHANGELOG</a>.</p> <p>For more information on using Arti, see our top-level <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/blob/main/README.md">README</a>, and the documentation for the <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/arti/-/blob/main/crates/arti/README.md"><code>arti</code> binary</a>.</p> <p>Thanks to everybody who's contributed to this release, including Aaron Dewes, Andrew Kloet, Boris Nagaev, Neel Chauhan, Nihal, syphyr.</p> <p>Also, our deep thanks to our <a href="https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors/">sponsors</a> for funding the development of Arti!</p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/announcements"> announcements </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/releases"> releases </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-05-21T00:00:00Ztails urn:uuid:53143417-65d2-3136-8f53-d90e2ea029c8 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_8/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_8/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tails-7_8/lead.jpg"> </picture> <div class="body"><h2>Changes and updates</h2> <ul> <li><p>Update <em>Tor Browser</em> to <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15014/">15.0.14</a>.</p> </li> <li><p>Remove <em>Thunderbird</em>.</p> <p>You can still <a href="https://tails.net/doc/anonymous_internet/thunderbird/">install <em>Thunderbird</em> as additional software</a>.</p> <p>If you have both the <strong>Thunderbird Email Client</strong> and <strong>Additional Software</strong> features of the Persistent Storage turned on, Tails automatically adds <em>Thunderbird</em> to your list of <a href="https://tails.net/doc/persistent_storage/additional_software/">additional software</a>.</p> <p>A new version of <em>Thunderbird</em> is released in Debian shortly after each Tails releases, because both <em>Tails</em> and <em>Thunderbird</em> follow the <a href="https://whattrainisitnow.com/calendar/">release calendar of <em>Firefox</em></a>. As a consequence, until Tails 7.5 (February 2026), the version of <em>Thunderbird</em> in Tails was almost always outdated, with known security vulnerabilities.</p> <p>By installing <em>Thunderbird</em> as additional software, the latest version of <em>Thunderbird</em> is installed automatically from your Persistent Storage each time you start Tails.</p> </li> </ul> <h2>Fixed problems</h2> <ul> <li><p>Fix multiple security vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel and haveged, that could allow an application in Tails to gain administration privileges.</p> <p>For example, if an attacker was able to exploit other unknown security vulnerabilities in an application included in Tails, they might then use one of these vulnerabilities to take full control of your Tails and deanonymize you.</p> </li> </ul> <p>For more details, read our <a href="https://gitlab.tails.boum.org/tails/tails/-/blob/master/debian/changelog">changelog</a>.</p> <h2>Get Tails 7.8</h2> <h3>To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage</h3> <ul> <li><p>Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.8.</p> </li> <li><p>If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a <a href="https://tails.net/doc/upgrade/#manual">manual upgrade</a>.</p> </li> </ul> <h3>To install Tails 7.8 on a new USB stick</h3> <p>Follow our installation instructions:</p> <ul> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/windows/">Install from Windows</a></p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/mac/">Install from macOS</a></p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/linux/">Install from Linux</a></p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/expert/">Install from Debian or Ubuntu using the command line and GnuPG</a></p> </li> </ul> <p>The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.</p> <h3>To download only</h3> <p>If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.8 directly:</p> <ul> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/download/">For USB sticks (USB image)</a></p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://tails.net/install/download-iso/">For DVDs and virtual machines (ISO image)</a></p> </li> </ul> <h2>Support and feedback</h2> <p>For support and feedback, visit the <a href="https://tails.net/support/">Support section</a> on the Tails website.</p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/tails"> tails </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/releases"> releases </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-05-19T00:00:00Zpavel urn:uuid:f4147219-7bb1-3b9c-8e6f-35e7f7b3fd16 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/fund-internet-freedom/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/fund-internet-freedom/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/fund-internet-freedom/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p><strong>A coalition of privacy, internet freedom, cryptocurrency and open-source ecosystems, led by the Tor Project and <a href="https://www.fundingthecommons.io/">Funding the Commons</a>, today announced <a href="https://internetfreedom.torproject.org/">a new participatory funding campaign</a> designed to support critical digital infrastructure at a moment of systemic funding instability.</strong></p> <p>Launching today at <a href="http://internetfreedom.torproject.org">internetfreedom.torproject.org</a> and as an <a href="http://swvbwbtmajvfrnz4wztx6ovshilm23ntigi73fz5wczj3aqdquq5icad.onion">Onion Service</a>, the campaign is the first-ever Web3-native crowdfunding initiative dedicated to the internet freedom ecosystem. The campaign accepts contributions in Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Zcash (ZEC), Monero (XMR), and Golem (GLM), and benefits 10 nonprofit projects working across privacy, censorship circumvention, secure communications, and public-interest digital infrastructure. An initial $115,000 USD matching pool supported by <a href="https://cakewallet.com/">Cake Wallet</a>, <a href="https://cakewallet.com/">Zcash Community Grants</a>, <a href="https://logos.co/">Logos</a>, and <a href="https://octant.app/">Octant</a> -- with additional ecosystem participation expected throughout the campaign -- will amplify donations made through June 18th, 2026, using a participatory matching model designed to reward broad community participation.</p> <h2>Internet freedom in peril</h2> <p>Internet freedom has declined <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2025/uncertain-future-global-internet">for 15 consecutive years</a>. As censorship and surveillance become increasingly sophisticated and pervasive, many of the tools people rely on to communicate and organize safely, access information freely, and protect their privacy are facing<a href="https://www.techpolicy.press/the-us-just-logged-off-from-internet-freedom/"> financial pressure and funding cuts</a>. Some organizations were forced to reduce staffing, scale back technical infrastructure, delay development work, and stop support for the communities that depend on them. This strain threatens the long-term sustainability of critical public-interest infrastructure.</p> <p>Today, the Tor Project and Funding the Commons, are launching a new experiment: a community-driven crowdfunding campaign exploring how internet freedom services and infrastructure can be funded more sustainably, transparently, and collectively. The campaign benefits organizations and tools supporting secure journalism, private communications, anti-censorship technologies, and privacy-preserving infrastructure used by millions of people worldwide.</p> <ul> <li><p><a href="https://securedrop.org/news/">SecureDrop</a>: Secure whistleblower submission system used by journalists and newsrooms</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://www.open-archive.org/">OpenArchive</a>: Privacy-first archiving tools for human rights defenders and journalists</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://onionshare.org/">OnionShare</a>: Open-source tool for secure, anonymous file sharing and hosting</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://www.ricochetrefresh.net/">Ricochet Refresh</a>: Metadata-resistant instant messaging over Tor</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://onionbrowser.com/">Onion Browser</a>: Tor-powered web browser for iOS</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://ooni.org/">Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)</a>: Global observatory documenting internet censorship and shutdowns</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://paskoocheh.com/?platform=android">Paskoocheh, by ASL19</a>: Anti-censorship technology and digital security support</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://unredacted.org/">Unredacted</a>: Infrastructure supporting censorship circumvention and resilient communications</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://miaan.us16.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=45fa6a038976b04956be0bb46&amp;id=f7503bf6ed">Digital Security Help Desk, by Miaan Group</a>: Internet freedom technologies supporting users in Iran</p> </li> <li><p><a href="https://osservatorionessuno.org/">Osservatorio Nessuno</a>: Protecting activists, journalists, and civil society organizations with tech support and traceless software</p> </li> </ul> <p>Tor cannot be resilient alone. Its resilience depends on the resilience of the ecosystem around it, especially smaller projects that may not have the same access to institutional funding or donor networks. This campaign is one way to bring more people into the shared responsibility of sustaining public-interest technology.</p> <h2>A participatory funding model</h2> <p>The campaign uses <a href="https://www.wtfisqf.com/">a participatory matching fund model called quadratic funding</a> designed to amplify the impact of many small contributions. Rather than prioritizing only large donations, the model increases support for projects backed by broader community participation, giving more people a meaningful voice in how funds are distributed. In practice, a project supported by many smaller contributors may receive more matching funds than one supported by only a few large donors.</p> <p><img src="https://blog.torproject.org/fund-internet-freedom/quadratic-funding.png" alt="Image Campaign contributions can be made in ETH, BTC, ZEC, XMR, and GLM"></p> <p>The campaign's matching pool is supported by a coalition of organizations aligned around privacy, open infrastructure, and public goods funding, including: Cake Wallet, Zcash Community Grants, Logos, and Octant. Contributions can be made using ETH, BTC, ZEC, XMR, and GLM.</p> <blockquote><p><em>"Privacy and internet freedom drive everything we build at Cake Wallet. We are proud to support Tor and the broader internet freedom ecosystem through this campaign, helping keep essential privacy tools accessible to everyone. Beyond supporting the mission, we are also users, advocates, and builders who have helped bring Tor's protections to over two million users worldwide."</em> <em>- Vik Sharma, CEO, Cake Wallet</em></p> <p><em>"Tor and Zcash protect complementary layers of privacy: Tor protects network privacy, while Zcash protects financial privacy. By supporting this campaign, Zcash Community Grants (ZCG) is helping sustain critical public-interest infrastructure for people who rely on privacy and internet freedom."</em> <em>- ZCG's members</em></p> </blockquote> <p>Internet freedom tools are digital public infrastructure, and they face many of the same funding challenges as other public goods: they are widely relied on, difficult to monetize ethically, and often invisible until they are under threat. Funding the Commons has spent years working with builders, funders, researchers, and public institutions to test new ways of sustaining public goods.</p> <p>Partnering with Funding the Commons gives us a way to bring internet freedom organizations into a broader conversation about how public-interest infrastructure is funded, and to test a model that can be reused, improved, and expanded over time:</p> <blockquote><p><em>"Quadratic funding is one of web3's answers to how critical infrastructure gets funded: Institutional money follows community signals, not the other way around," said David Casey, Director of Funding the Commons. "Any donation moves the match pool, no matter the size, putting weight behind the projects Tor users rely on every day."</em></p> </blockquote> <p><strong>The campaign launches today at: <a href="http://internetfreedom.torproject.org">internetfreedom.torproject.org</a> and <a href="http://swvbwbtmajvfrnz4wztx6ovshilm23ntigi73fz5wczj3aqdquq5icad.onion">http://swvbwbtmajvfrnz4wztx6ovshilm23ntigi73fz5wczj3aqdquq5icad.onion</a>, and accepts donations through June 18th, 2026.</strong></p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/announcements"> announcements </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/partners"> partners </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/advocacy"> advocacy </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/human-rights"> human rights </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/fundraising"> fundraising </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-05-19T00:00:00Zma1 urn:uuid:ee2631b8-43b6-352c-baba-1efd8945c7e1 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15014/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15014/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15014/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p>Tor Browser 15.0.14 is now available from the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/download/">Tor Browser download page</a> and also from our <a href="https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/15.0.14/">distribution directory</a>.</p> <p>This version includes important <a href="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/">security updates</a> to Firefox.</p> <h2>Send us your feedback</h2> <p>If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, <a href="https://support.torproject.org/misc/bug-or-feedback/">please let us know</a>.</p> <h2>Full changelog</h2> <p>The <a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/raw/maint-15.0/projects/browser/Bundle-Data/Docs-TBB/ChangeLog.txt">full changelog</a> since Tor Browser 15.0.13 is:</p> <ul> <li>All Platforms<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/44958">Bug tor-browser#44958</a>: Backport Security Fixes from Firefox 151</li> </ul> </li> <li>Windows + macOS + Linux<ul> <li>Updated Firefox to 140.11.0esr</li> </ul> </li> <li>Android<ul> <li>Updated GeckoView to 140.11.0esr</li> </ul> </li> <li>Build System<ul> <li>All Platforms<ul> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41781">Bug tor-browser-build#41781</a>: Fix clean section in rbm.local.conf.example</li> <li><a href="https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser-build/-/issues/41798">Bug tor-browser-build#41798</a>: Update the URL to versions.ini in relprep.py</li> </ul> </li> <li>Windows + Linux + Android<ul> <li>Updated Go to 1.25.10</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/applications"> applications </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/releases"> releases </a> </li></ul> </div> </article> 2026-05-18T00:00:00Zpavel urn:uuid:6b193962-624d-3a06-ae0f-5f096435e296 <article class="blog-post"> <picture> <source media="(min-width:415px)" srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/preserving-evidence-openarchive-fosters-accountability-media-sovereignty/lead.webp" type="image/webp"> <source srcset="https://blog.torproject.org/preserving-evidence-openarchive-fosters-accountability-media-sovereignty/lead_small.webp" type="image/webp"> <img class="lead" referrerpolicy="no-referrer" loading="lazy" src="https://blog.torproject.org/preserving-evidence-openarchive-fosters-accountability-media-sovereignty/lead.png"> </picture> <div class="body"><p><em><strong>This post is part of a spotlight series on <a href="https://internetfreedom.torproject.org/">the organizations defending the free Internet</a>.</strong></em></p> <p><strong>A picture may be worth a thousand words, but only if it survives. Behind every image or video is someone making a choice in real time: to document what they are seeing, preserve what others may try to deny, and take on the risks and responsibilities that come with creating archival records.</strong></p> <p>Now that technology outpaces regulation and social media is the dominant platform for news, communities sharing documentation of world events face exploitation and repression through targeting, surveillance, and media erasure or manipulation. Mobile media can disappear as quickly as it was captured because, for example, a phone gets confiscated, a platform removes it, or a company changes its content moderation policies. This media can become impossible to verify if or when metadata is stripped, potentially leading to unchecked mis- and disinformation due to media manipulation. Additionally, it can become dangerous when the wrong person can see who captured it or where it was stored.</p> <p>Eyewitnesses and the media they document and preserve, often depicting potential human rights violations, are increasingly at risk of being targets of surveillance, censorship, media manipulation, doxxing, and worse. In response to these growing threats, <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/">OpenArchive</a> first created the FLOSS <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/save">Save app</a> in 2015. Following their mission to offer people access to ethical, secure, decentralized backends, they then created their novel, custom <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/news/oa-hypha-white-paper">DWeb Storage</a> to further help communities safely preserve their documentation without having to depend on -- at best, unreliable, and, at worst, weaponized -- centralized platforms that can remove, lose, or expose sensitive data at a moment's notice.</p> <p>Their vision is a future where our histories are easily preserved, securely owned, and freely accessible. OpenArchive builds towards that future through <a href="https://www.humanrightscentered.design/">human rights-centered</a> co-research, education/training, and tool development dedicated to the ethical collection and long-term preservation of mobile media. To achieve this, we equally prioritize privacy, usability, archival integrity, and decentralized technology to equip human rights defenders, at-risk communities, journalists, and movements worldwide with tools to preserve, verify, and act on evidence of abuses, challenging extractive technology and amplifying marginalized voices. The premise is straightforward: people should be able to easily preserve their histories safely and on their own terms.</p> <h2>Built for conditions documenters actually face</h2> <p>For over a decade, OpenArchive has maintained <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/save">Save</a>, their free, open source flagship mobile app that helps people securely archive, verify, and encrypt their mobile media while working under real-world constraints. Co-created with and for its users, it supports authentication via SHA256 hashes and ProofMode, encrypted transit via TLS and Tor, long-term preservation to destinations like the <a href="https://archive.org/">Internet Archive</a>, <a href="https://nextcloud.com/">Nextcloud</a>, their novel <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/pdf/Mobile_DWeb_Archiving.pdf">DWeb P2P Storage backend</a> (in beta), and redundancy through multi-server backup.</p> <p>In practice, this work responds to urgent risks. For example, in conditions of conflict, they expedite local deployments of Save and run trainings for local archivist communities. Documenters on the ground had named phone confiscation, arrest, and internet outages as their primary risks, exactly the conditions Save is designed for.</p> <p>Additionally, in one case, human rights defenders facing corporate environmental abuse had a different challenge: none of the documenters they had surveyed were using encrypted tools in their workflows, leaving them vulnerable to tracking and surveillance. In other contexts, human rights defenders also named <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/news/memo-from-havana">privacy and inconsistent internet access as major barriers</a>, underscoring how easily documentation can become vulnerable before it ever reaches an archive.</p> <p>OpenArchive's work grounds those realities. Guided by the <a href="https://www.humanrightscentered.design/">human rights-centered design methodology</a> (co-created by OpenArchive's Executive Director, Natalie Cadranel and leading human rights experts), the team works with documenters, archivists, journalists, and advocates to understand their threats, constraints, workflows, and safety needs before designing tools around them.</p> <p>Most social media platforms are optimized for attention and monetization, not for archival preservation, provenance, or community control. A centralized platform presents a single point of failure, an easy access point for censorship, targeting, link rot, or account / company shutdowns.</p> <h2>From camera roll to decentralized archives</h2> <p>Responding to this specific need, <a href="https://www.open-archive.org/news/oa-hypha-white-paper">OpenArchive has built a novel p2p DWeb Storage backend</a> for Save, now in beta. In addition to Nextcloud and the Internet Archive, it gives communities an alternative to centralized platforms, one designed around privacy, verifiability, and resilience rather than someone else's business model.</p> <p>Under the hood, it uses two open source protocols: Veilid for encrypted peer-to-peer networking and anonymous connections, and Iroh for data storage, retrieval, replication, and verification. Save users can create groups, share files into repositories, and replicate media across peers, with encrypted communication and data integrity preserved throughout.</p> <p>"Decentralized storage" can sound abstract. But it actually means no single company, server, or account holds the records. Copies are distributed. Access is shared among trusted peers. If one node goes down (or gets shut down), the archive survives on the others.</p> <p>OpenArchive's role in the internet freedom ecosystem is protecting the chain of trust around media: who captured it, how it was handled, whether it remained intact, and whether the people behind it were put at additional risk. That chain is what makes documentation usable for journalism, legal evidence, historical memory, and accountability.</p> <p>Much of this work is quiet by necessity. The communities most in need of secure archiving are often the least able to publicize their use of it.</p> <p>By offering diverse and decentralized backends, Save is built for exactly that reality. When the platform shuts down the account, when the server goes offline, or when the border is closed, the record doesn't have to disappear with it.</p> </div> <div class="categories"> <ul><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/community"> community </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/human-rights"> human rights </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/partners"> partners </a> </li><li> <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/category/fundraising"> fundraising </a> </li></ul> </div> </article>