How to report bad relays

Kaspersky (the company) openly runs a number of published Tor nodes. This is not necessarily a bad thing, although I would prefer that businesses sponsor Noisebridge nodes in preference to running their own.

The Kaspersky blog is notable for treating USIC malware just like any other state-sponsored malware, which is valuable to our cause.

Like any successful Russian businessman, Kaspersky (the person) presumably finds it advisable to stay within the party line, for example by calling for the de-anonymization of the entire www. And he does have known ties to the Russian military and to the former KGB, so presumably he is not a natural ally of our most lethal enemy.

If the poster's more serious claim is true, something may soon appear here:

http://blog.kaspersky.com/tor-faq/

Exodus and like-minded entities are currently trying hard to intimidate the Tor userbase. The Tor Project can respond by working closely with experts at CCC, Kaspersky, Citizen Lab, etc., to reverse engineer and publish analyses of any state-sponsored malware found to be attacking fast Tor nodes, the torproject.org network, and personal devices used by Tor node operators and your staffers.

In fact, you can quietly set up honeypots designed to attract state-sponsored attacks, such as hidden services with not-elsewhere-published discussions of advanced steganography. We need to let our enemies know that they are likely to pay a price for unleashing their nastiest techniques against us.

We seem to be locked in a death spiral of mutual recrimination here, since by USIC standards, threatening to run a honeypot probably counts as "intimidation" of the NSA, and thus as "terrorism" [sic]. I beg to differ with any such "legal analysis", since running a honeypot is perfectly legal, and everyone enjoys a natural right of self defense when he comes under direct attack. But we are very obviously not getting a fair hearing in the corridors of power.

Some posters (but not you, I think) seem to advocate that we should conclude there is nothing to be done about NSA. But that's not true. There is much we can do about NSA, especially if we do not limit the scope of considered countermeasures to purely technological measures, but also include political, psychological, and economic strategies.

We have the inestimable advantage that OUR activity is entirely legal; THEY are the lawbreakers, the unauthorized intruders, the porn-passers, the kidnappers, the lethal drone-strikers. Taking the wider view, their problems are much worse and more intractable than ours. To name just two:

1. When the USIC adopted "collect it all", and determined that non-US citizens have no rights whatever, they in effect declared war on the entire world. Other governments have previously declared war on the entire world and they all were in the end decisively eradicated. Such will be the ultimate fate of NSA.

2. The people the USIC fears the most are demonstrably their own employees, who must inevitably feel resentment at the "continuous monitoring" BS. We can employ a little "suasion" of our own here.

We can win the War on US, and everyone will be the better for it.

Best of all, once we resolve the issue of regime change, we can all turn our attention to the issue which really matters: climate change.