Roger Dingledine Becomes Interim Executive Director of the Tor Project

One thing I'd like to suggest for the future: more emphasis on lobbying politicians in the US/Europe who may become "Tor-friendly" if someone credible can explain to them why Tor is so important for participatory democracy around the world-- and how their staffers can use Tor to improve their own cybersecurity while researching issues on-line.

Most of us tend to despise elected politicians-- not without reason-- but the fact remains that anything we can do to encourage them not to pass further oppressive and anti-democratic dragnet-surveillance-enabling laws, such as the recent Vomit Law in Spain (which targets a critically important partner of the Tails Project, Riseup Networks) would be helpful. And it is important to always bear in mind that Tor or citizen cryptography need not be made *explicitly* illegal in order for these necessities to be made *effectively* illegal.

I suggest that you consider hiring a professional lobbyist to track Tor-related legislation in the USA. I know... ugh. And this might not be cheap. But we need to counter the relentless anti-Tor propaganda from FBI/NSA infesting the American mass media. When asking US Tor users to contact their representatives, stating bill numbers can be very useful in helping harried staffers to figure out which pro-surveillance bill we are complaining about, and this information can be tracked by a lobbyist, who may also be able to arrange meetings between you (arms), Nick, and politicians or key staffers.

In the near future, please watch these very closely:

o CISA (too late, you say?)
o Fast Track Authority for Trans-Pacific Partnership trade treaty (too late, you say?)
o the Atlantic trade treaty which is even worse and may affect Tor even more severely
o proposed changes to Rule 41(b) of the US Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, which will apparently become law in January 2016 if the US Federal Congress fails to intervene.

The last of these appears to *explicitly* authorize FBI to use malware to illicitly intrude into, exfiltrate private data from, and even to destroy *any computer anywhere in the world*, without obtaining a search warrant from any court whose opinions are issued to the public. This "authorization" is merely implicit in CISA and TPP.

We know from the example set by the Dutch National Police, as previously discussed in this blog, that FBI is likely to target Tor routers with destructive malware, even without (manifestly unconstitutional) legal "authority", but it is important to oppose their efforts to place a veneer of "legality" over state-sponsored criminality.

One reason why trade treaties are potentially dangerous for Tor is that these set up super-national tribunals, whose judges would very likely include surveillance-military-industrial-complex lobbyists, which can override national legislatures, for example by voiding health information privacy laws, mandating encryption back doors, and so on. The reason why FTA (Fast Track Authority) is important is that if the US Congress passes this, it will have explicitly abandoned the role laid out for the Senate in the US Constitution with respect to reviewing, debating and ratifying (or not ratifying) international treaties, to such an extent that even a minor typo in the language of the Treaty will be unfixable.

One reason why US bills are particularly important for the Tor community is that the Project is based in the USA and therefore directly subject to US law, as are many key developers. Further, USA, Russia and China, are all playing major roles in driving the global "race to the bottom" in enacting oppressive dragnet surveillance legislation. Any success in stopping even one dangerous US law makes it just a bit harder for countries like Spain, France, or Netherlands to pass similar legislation. (And conversely.)

Another important long term goal involves reaching out more effectively to serious tech journalists (i.e. not the usual US militarist-media whores). Hiring a media director is an obvious step toward the latter goal, so thanks for that!

Along the same lines, I hope the Project will work to develop closer ties to organizations like Human Rights Watch and Reporters without Borders, which (unlike some USG Tor sponsors we could name) do not automatically conform to current USG foreign policy or cyberwar doctrine. Signing open letters also signed by organizations like HRW, Access, EFF, ACLU can send a useful signal that the Tor Project is serious about distancing itself from potential undercover USG influence through murky public-private partnerships like NED.

Lastly, I hope you will make it a priority to reject funding from any organization or company (SRI is a Tor sponsor, really?) which prevents the Project from openly disclosing the identity of such sponsors. Many Tor users around the world are likely to be rightly suspicious of the motivations of DARPA, SRI (yes?) etc in funding Tor.